REPUBLIC OF TURKEY PRIME MINISTRY
PRESIDENCY FOR TURKS ABROAD
AND RELATED COMMUNITIES

THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE ASIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION (ICAPA)

PROCEEDINGS

sub-themes:

"EDUCATION, ARTS & HUMANITIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIAN COMMUNITY WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMMON VALUES"

NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE ASIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

UNITAR

KEMENTERIAN PENDIDIKAN TINGGI

AKEPI AKADEMI KEPIMPINAN PENDIDIKAN TINGGI
HIGHER EDUCATION LEADERSHIP ACADEMY

UTM UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA

CASIS
Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation
مركز الدراسات العليا في الإسلام والعلوم والحضارة

20-24 July 2016
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Supported by:

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY PRIME MINISTRY
PRESIDENCY FOR TURKS ABROAD
AND RELATED COMMUNITIES

MINISTRY OF TOURISM AND CULTURE MALAYSIA

Malaysia Convention & Exhibition Bureau

Malaysia Truly Asia

In collaboration with:

KEMENTERIAN PENDIDIKAN TINGGI

AKEPT HIGHER EDUCATION LEADERSHIP ACADEMY
AKADEMI KEPIMPINAN PENDIDIKAN TINGGI

UNITAR

ASIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 2004

WORLD PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION DAEDONG

TFD
TURKISH PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Organized by:

KERANA TUHAN UNTUK MANUSIA
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA

UTM
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA

CASIS
Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation
مركز الدراسات العليا في الإسلام والعلوم والحضارة

This book which is published under the Project entitled "Education, Arts, and Humanities and Higher Education Leadership in the Asian Community within the Perspective of Common Values" is supported by Republic of Turkey, The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities. However, Republic of Turkey, The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities renounces responsibility for the content of this publication which does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the said organization. All responsibility for the content of the publication belongs to the respective authors.

12. Syafiq Borhanuddin, CASIS-UTM, Malaysia
"Ungku Aziz's Contributions to Decolonization in Malaysia" 139

V. DEVELOPING PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK AND PARADIGMS FOR THE DEWESTERNIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN ASIAN COMMUNITY

13. Tatiana Denisova, CASIS-UTM, Malaysia
"The Historiography of the Malay World from the Perspective of Decolonization: Main Issue and Misconceptions" 155

VI. THINKING FRAMEWORK, GLOBALIZATION AND VALUE STRUCTURES

14. Erdal Baykan, Necmettin Erbakan University, Turkey
"Modern Paradigm, Muslims And Possibilities" 169

15. Muharrem Hafız, Istanbul University
"Philosophical Decolonization: On the Intellectual Ground/Territory Required for the Elimination of Colonization" 175

16. Roslan Abd Jelani, Malaysia
"The Psychological Crisis and the Root Cause Destructive to Leadership: a Case Study Of Modern Secular-Humanistic Worldview and its Consequences on Leadership Behavior" 187

VII. DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES AGAINST DECOLONIZATION OF HUMANITIES IN THE ASIAN COMMUNITY: TURKISH-MALAYSIA EXPERIENCE

17. Muhammad Ikhwan Azlan and Mohd Hilmi Ramli, CASIS-UTM, Malaysia
"Legal Persons vis-à-vis al-Attas's Concept of Islamic University as Reflection of Perfect Man" 205

VIII. CHALLENGES IN EDUCATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES AND TURKEY

18. Bijoy Barua and Dip Kapoor, East West University, Bangladesh & University of Alberta, Canada
"Indigenous Transformative Learning and Decolonization in South Asia" 223

19. Faisal Malik, University of Toronto, Canada
"The Colonized Mind: A Preliminary Look into the Historical Foundations of the Educational crisis in the Muslim world" 233

20. Wardah Alkatiri, Green-Santri-Network Institute, Indonesia
"Sustainability Literacy: Some Challenges in Education in Developing Countries" 261

PHILOSOPHICAL DECOLONIZATION: ON THE INTELLECTUAL GROUND/TERRITORY REQUIRED FOR THE ELIMINATION OF COLONIZATION

Muharrem Hafız[1]

Abstract

Any sort of colonial mentality strives to subjugate the "other" and dictate its rule on it. In this respect, the logic of bipolarity, lying in the basis of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, is a point in question that can be understood as domination of oneself upon the other. This presentation, in which we will argue for the notion that "the colonial movement begins primarily within the mentalities", will focus on the importance and the value that societies have to appreciate to the productivity and the creativity via Plato's concept of "khora" (territory/space). In the Timaeus Plato presents a perspective that defies all bipolar structures including his previous theory of ideas. A third kind (territory/space) added into the logic of dichotomies displaces the structures which dictates its own rules (logos) upon the "other" in a sense. Yet, the impossibility of reaching an absolute and definite verdict about the objects appeared in the becoming world results from the uncertain and unattainable nature of territory/space (khora in Plato) enclosing the becoming as a whole. In other words, the contact between the binaries without a third kind will inevitably lead to the logic of domination in which one dictates its own law and will always get control of the other. In this presentation, 'the unattainableness of territory' will be ontologically emphasized and the possibility of philosophical decolonization will be discussed via the concepts of creativity, productivity and the awareness of the territory necessary for the elimination of the colonization.

Keywords: decolonization, philosophical decolonization, territory, Plato, Timaeus, khora

1 Assist. Prof. Dr. Muharrem Hafız, İstanbul University (muharremhafiz@outlook.com)

Introduction

In this study, the notion of "philosophical decolonization" will be used in the context of that a nation protects its values on intellectual ground and removing the obstacles before occupying its land by "other" external forces in the light of notions such as awareness, creativity and productiveness especially on the mental base. It will be mentioned that Plato's last theory of space/third kind (*khora*) stated between *logos* and *mitos* or reason and the senses through the *Timaeus* in order to defend that bipolarity rationale underlying the criticism is significantly effective to come to light the "colonization mentality". The only condition to displace colonization where "*one*" dictates own rules to the "*other*" is that bipolarity is abolished and the required land to arise territory/space which is between them or something is discovered. To achieve that, it will be referred to "*khora*" suggested as third kind by Plato in the dialogue of *Timaeus*.

In this dialogue Plato refers to spatial origin that everything has occurred and has formed in its own. In the *Timaeus* Plato adds the third kind (territory/space) to dual difference between ideas and senses. We think that possibility of decolonization is "awareness of this territory" on the philosophical ground, which is the individual, communal creativity and productiveness. Therefore, we need to scrutiny the term "khora" which is in Plato's Timaeus as a third kind.

Plato's *Timaeus* and His "Khora"

Plato's Timaeus starts with a third kind attached to the duality: "*One, two three*". In this way, the third kind attached to the all dualities such as ideas-senses, being-becoming, knowledge-opinion, visible-invisible, I-other, *logos-mitos* etc. has been involved in first sentence of the dialogue. This kind (*khora*), attached to Platonic dual structure but taking someone to limits of cognition unprecedentedly, has a nature defying such as all mentalities which makes sense of life with this dictate logic in the history of philosophy. At the heart of the dialogue, Plato enounces that the prior dichotomic distinction such as being-becoming or mind-senses needs to be added a new one.

This passage in which the third kind is started to be discussed gives us some clues as to that Plato will reconsider the structure of universe as the logic of dichotomy. However we must state that the dialogue, as we mentioned above, refers to this kind as of its first sentence. In a sense, the dialogue makes us feel secret and veiled traces of this kind (space), in the prior theory of ideas propounded in the *Republic*. For instance, in beginning part where Socrates summarizes "prior conversation", effect of "forgetting" is seen; not effect of "theory of remembrance (*anamnesis*)" which describes relation between the soul/reason (*nous*) and senses (*aisthesis*). Therefore, in relation between Socrates' previous conversation and the present one, traces of other kind show itself, but they are in secret and veiled form. It is also meaningful that Socrates starts with a question like "where is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and invited me here *today*?"

(*Timaeus*, 17a). This mentions that we can trace secret and veiled marks of *khora* which is attached to distinction in the middle of the work, initially announcing that this kind, which will constitute main matter of the dialogue, is related to a space, land and ground holding contrast such as yesterday-today or invitation-acceptance.[2]

It is profoundly important that Plato presents us the position of this kind by means of "scientific/cosmologic" matter which is the previous one of discussion. Because, the verdict of such as "*that is* ..." about something means that someone says of another one as a constant verdict about that object. Thus, someone who passes this verdict needs to reveal this foundation or underling territory/ground. Nevertheless, as far as Plato's concerned, the elements are not 'this' foundation/underlying thing, because of their structures relating to world which subjects to transformation. The passage in which Plato presents seeking stand and ground via *khora*, from this aspect, can be reviewed in terms of demanding to query the systems, ideologies or philosophers that pass fixed verdicts in fields such as philosophy, art, religion and theology etc. This presentation has been prepared to accept this invitation and demand. In other words, the problem about the fact that nations have to protect their territory/space on the intellectual surface contains connotations in the context of *khora*.

When it is considered that the reality of that philosophy is not an accomplished or ended "situation" and always necessitates an "action" and productivity, it has to be said that the logic of duality, which means that the "*one*" influences the "*other*" and dictates own rules to the "*other*", is contrary to philosophy itself. As for this kind of bipolarity, it is established on such logic of dictation. Besides, it is seen that this kind -if we state this kind with a modern terms "*subject*"- added to dual contrast has not an object/a thing, that subject posits it against/in front of himself or has anything about which subject can give objective information. Timaeus' argument, which bases on idea that everything existing has to be in existence in a space, reminds us spatial connotations of this kind. On the other hand the third kind (space) positioned between the paradigms and the senses cannot be showed as "a phenomenal object". However every existing thing has to be in existence in a space. These two arguments together coerce us to accept a third kind which is *inevitable uncertainty in-between* constant mind objects and sense objects depending on changing. Nevertheless, this space cannot be showed. Plato's third kind (*khora*) corresponded with notions such as matter, space, extension, soul, medium, mirror and void in history of philosophy, has a nature which contains every possibility, but does not disclose itself. This kind attached to distinction with its character requests reassessing and positioning of Plato's own ontology of bipolarity as well.

As far as *Timaeus* is concerned, the main problem is not dual distinction between ideas and senses or mind and phenomenon, a third one has been attached to the dis-

2 Muharrem Hafız, Khora: *Platon'un Üçüncü Türü ve Felsefe Tarihindeki Yorumları*, DM Kitap, İstanbul, 2016, p. 10.

tinction. Besides, on the one hand this kind attached to the distinction conceals and withdraws itself, on the other it has also a paradoxical structure which provides to apprehend the two kinds. Because of this necessarily uncertainty of this kind, we see that all theories as to creation of the universe and its changing/transformation have been explained with possible explanation. In other words, contrary to the logic of duality/dichotomy, it is made all contrasts be possible by being related with uncertain obligation of this kind via the third kind (*khora*). Hence, in the dialogue, Plato's all prior theories about the creation of the universe will be repositioned as possible explanations as to that is absolute and stable. Because, Plato does not think that a certain and stable scientific explanation as to the universe can be produced owing to nature structure of this kind. The procedural way that Timaeus follows is "approaching to the most reasonable and possible conclusion" (*eikotes logos: Timaeus*, 28a) owing to uncertainty of the third kind which is among dualities. Therefore, in every field such as philosophy, science, art or theology, keeping relation with this territory/space alive is inevitable so as to unearth productivity, creativity and keep them alive.

Before Plato makes Timaeus give speech as to this kind, he mentions the "*arkhe*" problem which is one of the most important in the history of philosophy.[3] He queries whether elements such as water, air, fire and earth which are expressed as basic base by former nature philosophers seeking constant and the first principle of universe; are truly able to be a base and a ground, or not. At first, Plato examines what the thing enabling us to say "*It is that*" about something *is*. In other words, what is *this thing* providing us to make inferences like "that is it" or "x is y" by indicating sense objects? What kind of thing is it? At this juncture, we see that Plato conveys the discussion to the elemental changing. If everything depends on changing, how can that these elements, which can be positioned as a base and foundation of phenomenal world, are out of the procedure of changing? In other words, can the thing itself, enabling us to pass constant and exact judgments like "x is y" to objects by indicating them, be experienced? If it can, that thing needs to depend on changing. In this case, it cannot be *this* base or foundation.

It is profoundly important that Plato presents the argument of third kind (*khora*) over the previous "scientific/cosmologic" issue/the problem of elements defended by Thales, Anaximenes, Heraklitus and Empedocles. The verdict of "*that is...*" about something means that someone dictates a constant verdict about that object into the other.[4] However this person who states the verdict has to reveal this foundation. According to Plato, elements are not that foundation, because they are related to the world of being liable to continuous change. Therefore the passage in which Plato presents seeking

3 Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: *The Timaeus of Plato*, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1935, p. 45; A.E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928, p. 88.

4 Dana R. Miller, *The Third Kind in Plato's Timaeus*, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2003, p. 11.

stand and ground via *khora* (space/territory) from this aspect can be reviewed in terms of demanding to question the systems, ideologies and philosophers that pass fixed verdicts in fields such as philosophy, art, religion and theology.

When it is understood as the holder and base which is necessary for something to arise, it is possible to correlate the receptacle/khora with Descartes' *'cogito'*, Spinoza's *'Causa Sui'*, Leibniz's *'monads'*, Kant's *'transcendental subject'*, Wittgenstein's *'logical extension'* or Einstein's *'absolute space'*. The main issue we are interested in is related to philosophers who take Plato's *Timaeus* and its third kind, and adapt these to their views. In addition, we must say that when used in the context of foundation, ground or territory, *khora* includes a lot of connotations related to basis of many systems and structures as mentioned above. Furthermore, *Timaeus* cannot be regarded as pure cosmogony/cosmology text by logic of (modern) scientific dualist awareness. Because with this aspect of view, something is either "that (*myth*/religious)" or "that (*logos*/science)": Both cannot be simultaneously the same thing. Whereas, Plato's *khora* provides us a link between two kinds (soul and senses) and provides us ground on which "one" can be seen as "other". In order to prove that total and comprehensive perspective in the *Timaeus*, Plato states a new gathering kind eliminating the logic of opposition by using the concept "receptacle" (*hypodoche*) in the first speech and the concept of "*khora*" in the second.

Timaeus makes the distinction given below at the very beginning of his speech (28a):

1. Always is *Being* and has no *Becoming*
2. Always is *Becoming* and never is *Being*

According to Timaeus, the first one is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. In this distinction while regarding the "one in itself" with a conceptual vision is a cognition belonging to being, multi-sensory realm is subject to change and motion. In continuation of the passage the conversation is stopped to be directed with another kind and the subjects handled by reason are revised and discussed again. (48e). Up to here the conversation is based on the dual-distinction between the being and becoming, but the conversation is reshaped with a new kind after here.[5]

The new beginning of the dialogue also reflects the otherness (eteron) which did not take place in the first distinction. In the first conversation, the distinction between being and becoming was made but the ground was not included in it. More precisely, since nothing can be comprehended between the two without the third kind in this dis-

5 John Sallis, *Chorology: On the Beginning in Plato's Timaeus*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1999, p. 48.

tinction, the third was left hidden and covered. Therefore this beginning should not start with a dual-distinction between being and becoming. The necessity of beginning stated in the end of the passage and the realization of this beginning in a more restraint and moderate discourse different form the previous stems from the structure of the third kind. At the beginning of the dialogue; Socrates' withdraw of the yesterday's speech and at this part of the dialogue Timaeus' withdraw of the previous distinction (28a) refers to a point of view that any sort of search for the absolute truth cannot obtain it as a whole.

In the next stage Timaeus includes the third kind to the previous dual-distinction:

> We must, however, in beginning our fresh account of the Universe make more distinctions than we did before; for whereas then we distinguished two Forms, we must now declare another third kind. For our former exposition those two were sufficient, one of them being assumed as a Model Form, intelligible and ever uniformly existent and the second as the model's Copy, subject to becoming and visible. A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, considering that those two were sufficient; but now the argument seems to compel us to try to reveal by words a Form that is baffling and obscure. (*Timaeus*, 48e-49a).

The passage where the third kind is put forth with different metaphors and evidences (48e-53b) is rather difficult to understand due to Plato's handling the issue with a similar complexity besides the ambiguity within the subject.[6] Primarily, Plato develops a mythic discourse on this kind and offers related metaphors for the complexity in its nature and the difficulty with regard to comprehending. The main of these metaphors are receptacle, gold and mother. However we will focus on the word "khora" here which also bears meanings of territory, country and homeland.

Khora, Territory and Philosophical Decolonization in the Context of the Unattainability of the Territory

We come across that the word "*khora*" , bearing the meanings of country, homeland, land, territory, terrain, village etc. is used in different dialogues such as; The Republic (373d 7, 388a 2, 414d 6, 423b 6, 495c 9, 516b 6), Parmenides (138c 6, 249a 1, 149a 1), *Theaitetos* (153e 1, 180e 4, 181c 6), Sofist (254a 9) and *Philebus* (24d 2) with different content. [7]

To give a few example of them, Socrates makes the explanation below in his dialogue the Republic in which he starts to build the ideal city: Assuming that people will go beyond the boundaries of the city and be drawn to an infinite greed of possession

6 Keimpe Algra, *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought*, E.J. Brill, New York, 1995, s. 76; Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, s. 241.

7 Anne Freire Ashbaugh, *Plato's Theory of Explanation: A Study of the Cosmological Account in the Timaeus*, State University of New York Press, New York, 1988, p. 103.

with the growing of the society and the increase of its needs over time after pointing out the intact/robust stage of the city and the society:

> And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not?" "It is." "Then we shall have to cut out a cantle2 of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants (*Republic*, 373d 7).

We see that the word "*khora*" in this passage is used with a meaning of "country" or "homeland". The word "khora" we come across in another part of this dialogue (414d 6) is the closest use in terms of meaning to the content of the *Timaeus*. Plato, in this passage likens the "khora" to a mother nurturing and raising her child as in the *Timaeus*. Additionally, adoption of a method of persuasion and convincing instead of a definite and obvious use in discourse reminds the measured language of *Timaeus*. In this part of the dialogue, Socrates mentions of a noble lie that could persuade and convince both the head of the state and the citizens as follows:

> I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth1 all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the territory (khora) as being their mother delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same territory (Republic, 414d-e).

Another passage in the *Republic* (423b 6) focuses on the issues of the city's land border (*khora*) to be determined in a reasonable manner. According to Socrates, the city can expand to an extent of not losing its integrity, but should it expand large enough to disrupt its unity that is a matter to be prevented. In this case the borders of the state should be determined as a restricted whole between the above-mentioned two. Furthermore there are similarities between another use of "*khora*" in the Republic (495c 9) and the discourse of Timaeus. In this passage, it is emphasized that the philosopher should not isolate himself from the society and the city and not leave his house/land (*khora*) alone and uncared where order is disrupted.

In the *Timaeus* (19a 5), Socrates reminds his statement about the necessity that the guardians and the rulers mentioned in the previous dialogue to be sent to the space (*khora*) they are worthy of, while concluding the summary of the dialogue (the Repub-

lic) made the previous day. This recall by Socrates in the Timaeus corresponds to the third use of khora (414d-415c) in *the Republic* as pointed out above. However as it can be remembered, at the very beginning of the dialogue while expressing the qualifications of the ideal state Socrates could not remember all and forgot many parts of the dialogue of the previous day (like the "theory of ideas") summarized it incomplete. Whereas here, Socrates' statement from previous speech about the necessity that "the philosopher should make a claim to this land (*khora*) where the images arise" in a way ensuring the transition between the mortal and the immortal is not forgotten. *Timaeus* reminds his reader that the real disaster will take place with the forgetting of this transition in the story of Atlantis just after this passage. So to say, Plato at this point makes a striking determination. Theories change and get forgotten, however the presence of the transition between the opposites (ferry/bridge) (*khora*) should be always noted.[8]

The Place of *Khora* in the *Timaeus*

In the next stage of the *Timaeus* includes the third kind in the distinction as in the previous partioning (receptacle: 48e 3-49a 6) in which the third kind is included in the metaphysical distinction. However inclusion here, as we will see shortly, is performed in accordance with a different purpose than before. As the passage where the third kind is included as receptacle continues through a metaphorical discourse over gold, mother, foster-mother, matrix, impress, smell etc. but this passage where the third kind is included as khora is supported with a reasoning (*logos*). Therefore, Plato has not developed an only and unchangeable discourse about receptacle/*khora* (space/territory) in terms of contact with the objects of reason and becoming. Should this kind to be regarded as a border between the two, he has tried to put forward the discourse about the internal basis of this border "receptacle" via mitos and the discourse about the external basis of this border "*khora*" via *logos*. So now we witness the re-distinction of these three kinds with a different style of discourse:

> This being so, we must agree that one kind is the self-identical form (*eidos*), ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by sense, it being the object which it is the province of reason to contemplate; and a second kind is that which is named after the former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again perishing, apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation (*aisthesis*); and a third kind is ever-existing place, which admits not of destruction, and provides place (topos) for all things that have birth, itself being apprehensible by a kind of bastard reasoning (*logismo notho*) by the aid of non-sensation, barely

8 Hafız, Khora ve Felsefe, p. 291.

> an object of belief; for when we regard this we dimly dream and affirm that it is somehow necessary that all that exists should exist in some spot (*edra*) and occupying some space (*khora*), and that that which is neither on earth nor anywhere in the heaven is nothing (52a 1-b 8).

This passage, indicating that everything should be in a space however this space itself cannot be shown by senses, is probably the most difficult to understand, complex and enigmatic section of the dialogue. This kind here is explored through place/space different from the passage where the receptacle is included in the distinction (48e).

We can show these three kinds in a schema as follows:

Kind I	Kind II	Kind III
always is	always comes to be	receptacle/khora
never comes to be	never is	receives coming to-be
apprehended by reason	apprehended by sensation	difficult and obscure
uncaused	caused	wandering cause
paradigm	The image of paradigm	that in which coming to-be [9]

Finally, the passage in which it is stated that *khora* can only be perceived as an object of faith with a mixed reasoning (*logismo notho*), should be understood as undecidability about it. In other words *khora* can only be comprehended with a dream-like awareness. This reflects the understanding that the truth as a whole cannot be comprehended as an object or human cannot see himself as a being, put across the truth, spectating it because along with khora. However human is *within* the truth with his whole being ever after. When viewed from this perspective, dream or imagination (*phantasia*) corresponds to a state of purgatory (araf in Turkish which also means the middle-point) between death and immortality. Timaeus reveals the relationship between the dream and the imagination at the end of the *khora*-passage as follows:

> So because of all these and other kindred notions, we are unable also on waking up to distinguish clearly the unsleeping and truly subsisting substance, owing to our dreamy condition, or to state the truth—how that it belongs to a copy—seeing that it has not for its own even that substance for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phantom of something else—to come into existence *in* some other thing, clinging to existence as best it may, on pain of being nothing at all; whereas to the aid of the really existent there comes the accurately true argument, that so

9 Miller, *The Third Kind in Plato's Timaeus*, p. 47.

long as one thing is one thing, and another something different, neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other so that the same thing becomes simultaneously both one and two (52b 9-d 4).

The state of purgatory between the soul/reason and the senses or knowledge and opinion, can be understood as the mediator role of *khora* remaining the same in one aspect and dependent on the other. This kind, comprehended through a deceptive reasoning since its legitimacy cannot be detected in a complete and precise way, in fact, cannot be determined in the relationship between the father and the child with reference to neither it is one and the same as a whole nor multiple as a whole.Then "as long as *'one'* remains as one thing and the *'other'* remains as another since one cannot emerge at the other, at the same time neither can it be one object nor two" (*Timaeus*, 52d) the necessity of a space between the two should be accepted in terms: Our relation with this form and its self and the comprehension of the world of becoming. In other words, the relationship of *one* (self, being, reason, knowledge, the first kind etc.) with the other (other, becoming, senses, opinion, the second kind etc.) requires a third kind which we observed in the passages that it is tried to be based over the idea of space, territory or ground. Besides how dreams see something as itself, khora, making the duality of being possible through an image, reflects in an ambigious manner but compulsory form that the being is cognizable in one way and not in another. Therefore the two kinds are repositioned through the third one and exclusionary structure of the bipolar (dyade) logic is negated.

Conclusion

In this presentation, we analyzed the concept of "philosophical decolonization" through the concept of "*khora*" in the *Timaeus* of Plato. What we claim is that without a third kind the relationship between the polar binaries is inevitable to result in a logic of domination (*logos*). In other words "colonization" that is a constant domination of one on the other and dictation of its own rule. However states and nations should stand up for and protect their philosophical territory as their concrete and real lands and borders. They also should reveal new ideas and approaches on scientific/artistic/ theological (religious) subjects with the power of the imagination. Such an attitude will be the biggest obstacle in front of the colonization by other nations. In this sense, philosophical decolonization can be evaluated in terms of the endless mobility of the philosophical thought throughout the history and search for new principles after grounding in order to ground that too. We believe that the logic of domination in which one dictates its own law on the other with a logic of duality can be avoided with a quest requiring continuous breaks and through the undeterminable and undecidable nature of this *in-between* kind/territory or ground. In conclusion, the only ultimate condition in order to end or prevent the colonization descended on the nations is to designate the philosophical decolonization (productivity and creativity) as the only principle by owning the territory

inherent (immanent) in genetic and traditional codes of the society itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Algra, Keimpe, *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought*, E.J. Brill, New York, 1995.

Anne Freire Ashbaugh, *Plato's Theory of Explanation: A Study of the Cosmological Account in the Timaeus*, State University of New York Press, New York, 1988.

Cornford, Francis M., *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato*, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1935.

Hafız, Muharrem, *Khora: Platon'un Üçüncü Türü ve Felsefe Tarihindeki Yorumları*, DM Kitap, İstanbul, 2016.

Miller, Dana R., *The Third Kind in Plato's Timaeus, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht*, Göttingen, 2003.

Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. W.R.M. Lamb, Harvard University Press, London, 1925.

Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Co., 1997.

Sallis, John, *Chorology: On the Beginning in Plato's Timaeus*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1999.

Taylor, Alfred Edward, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Claren¬don Press, Oxford, 1928.